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Abstract
Decisions with long-term consequences require comparing utility derived from
present consumption to future welfare. But can we infer socially relevant in-
tertemporal preferences from saving behavior? I allow for a decomposition of the
present generation’s preference for the next generation into its dynastic and cross-
dynastic counterparts, in the form of welfare weights on the next generation in
the own dynasty and other dynasties. Welfare weights on other dynasties can be
motivated by a concern for sustainability, or if descendants may move or marry
outside the dynasty. With such cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism, savings
for one’s own descendants benefit present members of other dynasties, giving rise
to preference externalities. I find that socially relevant intertemporal preferences
may not be inferred from saving behavior if there is cross-dynastic intergenera-
tional altruism. I also show that the external effect of present saving decreases
over time. This means that intertemporal preferences inferred from saving be-
havior are time-inconsistent, unless cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism is
accounted for.
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1 Introduction
Managing resources requires trading off the interests of different generations.
Climate policy, for example, must balance the mitigation costs incurred by
the present generation against the benefits from a stable climate that accrue
to future generations (Kolstad et al., 2014). As optimal resource management
depends on the weights assigned to each generation (Stern, 2007; Nordhaus,
2007; Drupp et al., 2018), determining the trade-off between different gen-
erations has been described as “one of the most critical problems of all of
economics” (Weitzman, 2001: 260).
Determining this trade-off depends on the sacrifice that the present gener-
ation is willing to make for future generations (Goulder and Williams, 2012;
Kelleher, 2017). Economists usually impute the social welfare function from
returns in the market on either corporate capital, equities or bonds, depend-
ing on project maturity and risk profile (Arrow et al., 1995; Gollier, 2012).
Hence, the discount rate is implied by saving behavior. However, the tradi-
tional models consider altruism only for own descendants. I find that calibra-
tion saving behavior might not reveal the sacrifice that the present generation
is willing to make if there is altruism for the descendants of others. I also
show that the discount rate consistent with saving behavior is decreasing in
the time horizon, and only over time approaches the socially desirable level.
Altruism for the descendants of others can be motivated by a concern
for sustainability, or if own descendants may move or marry (Bernheim and
Bagwell, 1988; Laitner, 1991). With such altruism, the welfare of the present
generation depends on their own utility and the welfare of the next genera-
tion across dynasties (parallel families or social groups). This paper extends
Sen (1961, 1967) and Marglin’s (1963) two-period model of intergenerational
altruism to a stationary infinite horizon setting. This allows for a novel de-
composition of intergenerational altruism into its dynastic and cross-dynastic
counterparts. Dynastic intergenerational altruism gives the own dynasty wel-
fare weights (Barro, 1974), while cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism
gives the welfare weights on all other dynasties (Figures 1a and 1b illustrate
the preference of generation 0 in dynasty 1 when there are two dynasties).
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(a) Dynastic intergenerational altruism.
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(b) Cross-dynastic intragenerational altruism.
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(c) Consequence of saving for own descendants.
Figure 1: Welfare implication of incremental utility backward in time (direc-
tion of arrows). Subscript refers to generation, superscript to dynasty.
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The network of altruistic links implies an infinite chain of concerns.
I investigate whether altruism for the next generation is reflected in the
market by considering a traditional game of saving for own immediate de-
scendants (Shapley, 1953). The game is a tractable model in which cross-
dynastic intergenerational altruism can be studied analytically. Crucially,
savings for one’s own descendants benefit the present members of the other
dynasties when they have cross-dynastic altruism (see Figure 1c), giving rise
to preference externalities.
The analysis shows the existence of a stationary Markov-perfect equilib-
rium in linear strategies with a saving rate that is inefficiently low. I also
establish that a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in the finite horizon ver-
sion of the game exists. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategies used in these
finite horizon games go to the linear strategy when the time horizon goes to
infinity. The equilibrium saving rate in this equilibrium is increasing in in-
tergenerational altruism, both within and between dynasties. For constant
total intergenerational altruism, it is decreasing in the number of dynasties.
Assuming that the altruistic weight on each of the other dynasties goes to
zero in the limiting case, when the number of dynasties goes to infinity, the
saving rate reduces to the Brock-Prescott-Mehra saving rate (Brock, 1979,
1982; Prescott and Mehra, 1980), the rate without cross-dynastic intergener-
ational altruism. This means that cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism
is not affecting the equilibrium saving rate in the limit when the number of
dynasties goes to infinity.
In contrast, dynasties choose the efficient saving rate if they cooperate
by acting as if there is only one dynasty. Such a coalition would capture any
generation’s altruism for the next generation. I find that the efficient saving
rate is increasing in intergenerational altruism, both within and between
dynasties. The wedge between the efficient and equilibrium saving rates
measures the externality problem. I find that this wedge is positive if there
is cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism. I also establish that this result
is qualitatively robust even with intragenerational altruism, as long as the
weight on the utility of the present generation as compared to the weight
on the utility of the next generation is higher for the own dynasty than the
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other dynasties.
The wedge between the efficient and equilibrium saving rates can also
be derived from the discount functions. I find that the external effect of
present saving becomes less important over time, and vanishes only in the
limit. Cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism thus leads to different dis-
count functions in equilibrium and under efficiency. In general, the discount
rates converge only in the limit, as time goes to infinity. This means that a
dynasty’s discount rate is smaller for long-term projects, leading to a time-
inconsistency problem unless the dynasties cooperate.
Accounting for cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism beyond what is
reflected by saving behavior translates into an increase in the relative weight
on future generations. Nordhaus (2008) offers an influential market-based
calibration. Respecting the distribution that would arise following the pref-
erence of the present generation (thereby retaining Nordhaus’ setting but ab-
stracting away from crowding out of saving), I illustrate that cross-dynastic
intergenerational altruism of 10% and 20% beyond the level of intergenera-
tional altruism inferred from saving behavior imply utility discount rates of
1.2% and 0.9%, as compared to the Nordhaus rate of 1.5%. The immedi-
ate implication for policy guidelines is thus that discount rates inferred from
saving behavior should be lowered. The extent of this adjustment depends
on the degree of cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism. Even if cross-
dynastic intergenerational altruism cannot be inferred from saving behavior,
it therefore plays an important normative role.
1.1 Contribution to the literature
Beyond showing that altruism for the next generation may not be reflected
in the market, I contribute to the literature on present-biasedness. Cross-
dynastic intergenerational altruism implies time-inconsistency (for early con-
tributions on time-inconsistency, Strotz, 1955-1956; Phelps and Pollak, 1968).
Time-inconsistency has influenced the study of discounting (Weitzman, 2001;
see Arrow et al., 2013 and Groom and Hepburn, 2017), as well as procrastina-
tion, intoxication, and addiction (Asheim, 1997). My study on cross-dynastic
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intergenerational altruism makes two contributions. First, cross-dynastic in-
tergenerational altruism serves as a microfoundation for declining discount
rates in equilibrium (relating to Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Sa´ez-Marti and
Weibull, 2005; Galperti and Strulovici, 2017), since the external effect of
present saving weakens over time. In the cited papers, time-inconsistency
follows from intergenerational altruism being sensitive beyond the next gen-
eration of the same dynasty. In my paper, time-inconsistency is due to altru-
ism for the next generation as such. I further establish that cross-dynastic
intergenerational altruism implies constant discount rates under efficiency.
The equilibrium discount rate converges only to the lower efficient discount
rate as time goes to infinity. This follows because the external effect of
present saving vanishes only in the limit. Second, the preference formulation
permits the saving rates to be derived from generalized consumption Euler
equations (Hiraguchi, 2014; Iverson and Karp, 2018; Laibson, 1998), but for
a distinct reason: Hiraguchi (2014) and Iverson and Karp (2018) assume de-
clining discount rates when deriving the saving rate. Here, the relation is an
outcome of the game of saving.
I contribute to the literature on dynamic interdependent utility and sav-
ing behavior. Cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism implies a system of
benevolent utility functions (Pearce, 1983; Bergstrom, 1999). Recent ad-
ditions to the literature focus on static interdependent utility (Bourle`s et
al., 2017), as well as dynamic interdependent utility without considering sav-
ing behavior (Millner, 2019). My paper clarifies consequences in terms of
saving. I thus relate most closely to a classical result on dynamic interde-
pendent utility and saving behavior by Sen (1961, 1967) and Marglin (1963).
They study a two-period model in which present members of dynasties are
altruistic toward own descendants and descendants in other dynasties. As in
my paper, they also find that equilibrium saving rate is inefficiently low. Sen
(1961) names it the “isolation paradox” because each dynasty would agree
collectively to save more, although no dynasty is willing to do so in “iso-
lation”. My study on cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism makes two
contributions beyond this earlier work. First, through my analysis I reinves-
tigate conditions for the “isolation paradox” to arise. Sen’s (1967) condition
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is that the relative weight on the utility of the present and next generations
is strictly larger for the own dynasty than the other dynasties. I establish
that the condition is the same in a stationary infinite horizon setting. The
intuition is that if there is a discrepancy between the relative discounting of
the first two generations then there is also a discrepancy in any two genera-
tions. Second, accounting for cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism also
exposes a limitation to, and extends, Sen’s (1967) formulation of the “isola-
tion paradox”. In Sen’s two-period model, cross-dynastic intergenerational
altruism cannot effect the decision of how much to save. This is not the case
in the stationary infinite horizon model of this paper, except in the limit
case, when the number of dynasties goes to infinity.
I also relate to three other literatures. First, the preference formulation
offers a new interpretation of discount functions (building on Bernheim and
Bagwell, 1988; Laitner, 1991; Zhang, 1994; Myles, 1997). Cross-dynastic
intergenerational altruism can be interpreted as the relative probability of
immediate descendants ending up in other dynasties, for example through
mating. Since the external effect of present saving becomes less important
over time and vanishes only in the limit, the weight on each dynasty converges
to a uniform distribution. Second, the existence of cross-dynastic intergen-
erational altruism is consistent with findings from surveys of intergenera-
tional time preferences (Cropper et al., 1991, 1992, 1994; Johanneson and
Johansson, 1997; Frederick, 2003) and experiments (Chermak and Krause,
2002; Fischer et al., 2004; Hauser et al., 2014; Molina et al., 2018; see Fehr-
Duda and Fehr, 2016 for a perspective). There is also a strong empirical
support for a smaller weight on the other dynasties in this generation than
the own dynasty (Bernhard et al., 2006 and references therein for evidence
on “parochial” altruism; see Schelling, 1995 for a perspective). This is my
conceptual basis for claiming that the large discount rates implied from sav-
ing behavior do not respect the present generation’s preference for the next
generation. Third, there is an analogy between cross-dynastic intergenera-
tional altruism towards the other dynasties and back again from the other
dynasties, and the indirect concern caused by technological spillovers from
one dynasty to another. Such linkages through technology may also lead to
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time-inconsistency (Harstad, 2019).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an informal motivating
example, clarifying how the preference externalities are generated. Section
3 presents the model. Section 4 derives the main results, in the context of
a wedge between the equilibrium and efficient saving rates. Section 5 es-
tablishes how the main results relate to time-inconsistency, and explains the
contributions of the paper. Section 6 establishes how the main results re-
late to interdependent utility, and explains the contributions of the paper.
Section 7 concludes with a numerical exercise, illustrating the policy impli-
cations. Appendix A contains additional proofs. Appendix B provides an
interpretation of the model if descendants may move or marry someone from
other dynasties.
2 Motivating example
Structure the problem by defining α ∈ (0, 1) as any generation’s altruism
for the next generation. Generation 0 thus assigns weights 1 to itself and
α to the next generation, so that W0 = (1 − α)u0 + αW1, where W , u and
subscript refer to welfare, utility and generation. But any future generation
t will do so in turn: Wt = (1 − α)ut + αWt+1. This leads to the following
relative weights on (u0, u1, u2, . . . ) from the perspective of generation 0: 1−
α, (1 − α) · α, (1 − α) · α2, . . . , which is proportional to (and in line with
Samuelson, 1937):
1, α, α2, . . . . (1)
This preference is stationary, so that time-consistency follows from time-
invariance. The question then, is whether the preference for the future is
reflected by saving behavior.
To illustrate the consequences of a particular network, suppose that there
are only two dynasties. Assume, for simplicity, that altruism is only inter-
generational, so that there is no altruism for contemporaries in the other
dynasty. (I show in Section 6 under which condition the main results hold
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Figure 2: Resulting discount functions with two dynasties (sequences). Wel-
fare implication of incremental utility backward in time (direction of arrows).
Subscript refers to generation, superscript to dynasty.
even if there is altruism for contemporaries in the other dynasties.) Con-
sequently, the present generation of any dynasty assigns weights 1 to itself
and α to the next generation in both dynasties. The weight on the next
generation consists of two parts, defining the network. Write α ≡ αD + αC ,
where αD and αC are dynastic and cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism.
As extreme cases, any dynasty might care only for own descendants: αD = α
(Barro, 1974), or equally for all descendants: αD = αC = α/2. It is natural
to assume that αD ≥ αC ≥ 0 (e.g., Myles, 1997), that is a dynasty cares
weakly more for its own descendants.
Consider the network implied by αC > 0. Figure 2 illustrates the prefer-
ence of generation 0 in dynasty 1, with positive weights on future generations
also in the other dynasty. These weights follow from accounting for the total
number of dynastic and cross-dynastic altruistic links forward in time. The
weights assigned by generation 0 in dynasty 1 to dynasties 1 and 2 can be
written
1, αD, α
2
D + α
2
C , . . .
0, αC , 2αDαC , . . .
(2)
To see this, consider α2D+α
2
C in Figure 2. This follows because generation 0 in
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(a) Instantaneous discount factors for dynasty 1 (sequence).
𝑢0
2 𝑢1
2 𝑢2
2 ---
𝑢0
1 𝑢1
1 𝑢2
1 ---
𝛼𝐷
(b) Instantaneous discount factors for dynasty 1 (sequence).
Figure 3: Welfare implication of incremental utility backward in time (direc-
tion of arrows). Subscript refers to generation, superscript to dynasty.
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dynasty 1 cares dynastically for generation 1 which, again, cares dynastically,
and because generation 0 in dynasty 1 cares cross-dynastically for generation
1 which, again, cares cross-dynastically. The preference of generation 0 in
the other dynasty is the mirror image of (2).
Interpret a game of saving for own immediate descendants (Shapley, 1953)
as the relevant market. In a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium with lin-
ear strategies, generation 0 in dynasty 1 considers only the first sequence
of (2) as cross-dynastic transfers are not allowed. This gives rise to pref-
erence externalities because savings for one’s own descendants benefit the
present members of the other dynasty. Furthermore, the within-dynasty
instantaneous discount factors, αD, αD + α
2
C/αD, . . . follow from αD and
(α2D + α
2
C)/αD, and are illustrated in Figure 3a. I have that αD + αC =
α ≥ αD + α2C/αD > αD. This means that that the external effect of present
saving on the other dynasty becomes less important over time, leading to
non-stationary preferences (as illustrated by comparing Figure 3b, where in-
stead the preference of generation 1 in dynasty 1 is considered, to Figure
3a), thus being time-inconsistent if preferences are time-invariant (Strotz,
1955-1956; Halevy, 2015).
In contrast, the efficient saving captures any generation’s altruism for the
next generation. Recall that sequences 1 and 2 (from (2)) are the weights
of generation 0 in dynasty 1, and that the mirror image gives the weights of
dynasty 2. Assuming no side-transfers, it will later be verified that efficiency
in the game of saving implies equal relative importance of 1/2 on each of
the two dynasties, so that they act as if there were only one dynasty. For
dynasty 1, this gives
1/2 · 1, 1/2 · αD, 1/2 · (α2D + α2C), . . .
1/2 · 0, 1/2 · αC , 1/2 · 2αDαC , . . .
And symmetrically, for dynasty 2. Adding up, efficiency thus recovers se-
quence (1), the preference for the next generation.
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3 Model
Society is divided into N ≥ 2 equally populated dynasties. Index these by
i = 1, 2, . . . . Time t ≥ 0 is discrete and countably infinite. Write N =
{1, 2, . . . } and N0 = N ∪ {0} for the natural numbers without and with 0.
Generations, also indexed by t, are non-overlapping, and live for one period
only.
A consumption stream 0c
i = (ci0, c
i
1, . . . ) ≥ 0 is feasible given an initial
level of wealth xi0 ≥ 0 if there exists a wealth stream 0xi = (xi0, xi1, . . . ) ≥ 0
such that
xit = c
i
t + k
i
t for all t ∈ N0, and (3)
xit = Ak
i
t−1 for all t ∈ N.
The present generation in dynasty i has wealth xit. The action taken by each
dynasty i is to save kit ≥ 0 for own immediate descendants. The residual,
cit, is consumed. Hence, no cross-dynastic transfers are possible. Wealth
is determined by the saving of the previous generation in the same dynasty,
kit−1, multiplied by a gross productivity parameter, A ≥ 1. Such a technology
is referred to as the AK model (Romer, 1986), and is a tractable model in
which cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism can be studied analytically.
Denote by
Xτ (x
i
0) = {0xi : xi0 = xi and 0 ≤ xit ≤ Axit−1 for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , τ}} (4)
the set of feasible wealth streams until time τ ∈ N. Write X(xi0) = X∞(xi0).
Hence, X(xi0) denotes the set of feasible wealth streams. Furthermore, define
xt = (x
1
t , x
2
t , . . . , x
N
t ) as the distribution of wealth at time t ∈ N0.
Define
c(0x
i) = (xi0 − xi1/A, xi1 − xi2/A, . . . )
as the consumption stream that is associated with 0x
i, and denote by
C(xi0) = {0ci : there is 0xi ∈ X(xi0) s.t. 0ci = c(0xi)}
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the set of feasible consumption streams.
Map consumption cit ≥ 0 into utility by the utility function u : R+ →
R ∪ {−∞} defined by:
u(cit) =
{
ln cit if c
i
t > 0,
−∞ if cit = 0.
The present generation in dynasty i has a logarithmic utility function, which
justifies the first equality in (3). Write u(0c
i) = (u(ci0), u(c
i
1), . . . ) and denote
by
U(xi0) = {0ui : there is 0ci ∈ C(xi0) s.t. 0ui = u(0ci)}
the set of feasible utility streams. Write U = ⋃xi∈R+ U(xi0).
The present generation of dynasty i cares about immediate descendants
in all dynasties. I allow for a decomposition of intergenerational altruism
into its dynastic, αD, and cross-dynastic, αC , counterparts. The following
assumption on the network of altruistic links will be useful:
Assumption 1 Altruism parameters have the following restrictions: 1 >
αD + αC > 0 and αD ≥ αC/(N − 1) ≥ 0.
The restrictions embody the extreme cases: αD > αC = 0 (Barro, 1974) and
αD = αC/(N − 1) > 0 (e.g., Myles, 1997), weight only on own immediate
descendants and equal weight on the immediate descendants of all.
In particular, the preference of each dynasty is represented by the welfare
function W i. Denote by W−i the vector of welfare in other dynasties. Assume
that there exists an aggregator function V : (R ∪ {−∞})N+1 → R ∪ {−∞}
defined by:
V (ui,W i,W−i) = (1− αD − αC)ui + αDW i + αC
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
W j, (5)
where ui is the utility of the present generation in dynasty i, W i is the welfare
of the immediate descendants of the same dynasty, and W j is the welfare of
the immediate descendants of another dynasty. Assume furthermore that
V = −∞ if ui = −∞.
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The aggregator function, V , implicitly defines the welfare function. It
assumes that intergenerational altruism is constant, non-paternalistic and
sensitive only for the next generation, in the sense that the welfare of the
present generation in dynasty i is derived from own utility and the welfare
of immediate descendants in the different dynasties (following Ray, 1987, for
the within-dynasty case).
I show in Section 6 that the main results hold qualitatively even with
intragenerational altruism as long as the weight on the utility of the present
generation as compared to the weight on the utility of the next generation
is higher for the own dynasty than the other dynasties. To ease exposition,
I abstract from these complications when deriving the main results.
3.1 Equilibrium concept
The strategic setting is how to best respond to the present saving of other
dynasties and the future saving of all dynasties. I defined in (4) the set
of feasible wealth streams until time τ for a single dynasty. Write the set
of histories as hτ (x0) = Xτ (x
1
0) × · · · × Xτ (xi0) × · · · × Xτ (xN0 ), as initial
wealth can vary. This gives h0(x0) = x0. When deciding how much to
save, the dynasties see the entire history, hτ . Write the union of histories as
H(x0) =
⋃
τ∈N0 hτ (x0). Map the union of histories into present saving by a
strategy ki,σ : H(x0)→ R+. Unimprovability is defined such that no strategy
that differs from it after only one history can increase welfare. The strategy
is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) if and only it, for any i and for any
history hτ , is unimprovable. This follows because the game is continuous at
infinity.
I restrict attention to Markovian strategies (Maskin and Tirole, 2001).
Under this restriction, there exists a unique equilibrium in linear strategies.
This equilibrium is the limit of the unique unrestricted equilibrium of a finite
horizon game when the horizon goes to infinity. Define a Markovian strategy
ki,µ : RN+ → R+ as a function from present wealth xt to present saving, where
xt contains all payoff-relevant information at time t (the last entry into hτ ).
The strategy is also stationary because it is independent of calendar time.
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Denote by x and x+1 the present and next period wealth levels. Write
optimal behavior in the form of a value function from dynamic programming.
In particular, a value function U i : RN+ → R ∪ {−∞} defined over wealth
levels satisfies
U i(x) = max
ki∈[0,xi]
V (ui, U i+1, U
−i
+1)
= max
ki∈[0,xi]
{
(1− αD − αC)ui + αDU i+1 +
αC
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
U j+1
}
, (6)
where ui = u(xi − ki) is defined as the utility of the present generation in
dynasty i, U i = U i(A(xi − ki), x−i+1) the induced welfare of the immediate
descendants of the same dynasty, and U j = U j(x−i+1, A(x
i− ki)) the induced
welfare of the immediate descendants of another dynasty.
A Markovian strategy is unimprovable if it satisfies ki,µ(x) = argmaxki U
i(x)
for all i and wealth x. As above, it is an SPE if and only if it is unimprov-
able. A stationary Markovian strategy profile that is an SPE is a stationary
Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE).
4 Main results
4.1 Equilibrium
I now report the main results. I have the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, there exists a stationary MPE where all
dynasties use the linear strategy:
ki,µ(xt) = sx
i
t (7)
for all i and xt, where the constant saving rate, s, is given by
s = αD +
α2C
(N − 1)(1− αD − αC) + αC . (8)
This is the limit of the unique finite time horizon SPE when time goes to
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infinity.
Proof. The proof of existence is an application of the unimprovability prop-
erty. Assume that all generations in dynasties j 6= i and all future generations
in dynasty i use the linear strategy (7). This gives a marginal propensity to
consume of 1− s.
Write:
y ≡ U i(xt),
zj ≡ U j(xt),
u ≡ ln((1− s)xit),
vj ≡ ln((1− s)xjt).
By observing that the gross growth rate is sA, it follows from (6):
y = (1− αD − αC)u+ αD (y + ln(sA)) + αC
N − 1
∑
`
(
z` + ln(sA)
)
,
zj = (1− αD − αC)vj + αD
(
zj + ln(sA)
)
+
αC
N − 1
(
(y + ln(sA)) +
∑
` 6=j
(
z` + ln(sA)
) )
,
for all j. Solving the set of these equations, yield:
y =
((N − 1)(1− αD)− (N − 2)αC)u+ αC
∑
` v
`
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC (9)
+
αD + αC
1− αD − αC ln(sA),
zj =
((N − 1)(1− αD)− (N − 2)αC)vj + αC(u+
∑
6`=j v
`)
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC (10)
+
αD + αC
1− αD − αC ln(sA),
for all j.
Insert for (9) to (10) in (6). The problem is to show that kit = sx
i
t
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maximizes
(1− αD − αC) ln(xit − kit) + αD
((N − 1)(1− αD)− (N − 2)αC) ln((1− s)Akit)
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC
+ αC
αC ln((1− s)Akit)
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC .
The first derivative is:
−1− αD − αC
xit − kit
+
αD((N − 1)(1− αD)− (N − 2)αC) + α2C
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC
1
kit
,
which yields the first-order condition:
1− αD − αC
xit − kit
=
αD((N − 1)(1− αD)− (N − 2)αC) + α2C
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC
1
kit
,
Therefore:
kit
xit
= αD +
α2C
(N − 1)(1− αD − αC) + αC = s,
which gives kit = sx
i
t.
The second derivative is:
−1− αD − αC
(xit − kit)2
− αD((N − 1)(1− αD)− (N − 2)αC) + α
2
C
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC
1
(kit)
2
,
and is strictly negative for kit ∈ (0, xit). This verifies that the problem is
concave. kit = sx
i
t therefore maximizes the problem. There is no profitable
deviation for the present generation in dynasty i when all generations of dy-
nasties j and all future generations in dynasty i use the linear strategy (7).
It is verified that there exists a stationary MPE where all dynasties use a
linear strategy. Hence, the saving of one dynasty is independent of the wealth
levels of other dynasties.
Proving that (7) is the limit of the unique finite time horizon SPE when
time goes to infinity requires additional notation introduced in Section 5. A
proof is delegated to Appendix A. It is shown that there exists a unique SPE
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in the finite horizon game for any horizon. The equilibrium strategies used
in these finite horizon games go to the linear strategy with s given by (8)
when the horizon goes to infinity.
I obtain the following corollary, describing the properties of the equilib-
rium saving rate, s:
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium saving rate, s, has the
following properties:
(i) s = αD if αC = 0.
(ii) s is increasing in αD.
(iii) s is increasing in αC.
(iv) s is decreasing in N if αC > 0.
(v) s→ αD if N →∞.
This follows from expression (8), and is proved in Appendix A.
Without cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism, the saving rate reduces
to the Brock-Prescott-Mehra rate of αD (Brock, 1979, 1982; Prescott and
Mehra, 1980). This follows because the cross-dynastic intergenerational al-
truism of the descendants in the other dynasties in the next generation has
(almost) no concern for dynasty i. The saving rate is decreasing in the num-
ber of dynasties, as it increases the externality problem. Since the altruistic
weight on other dynasties goes to zero in the limiting case, when the number
of dynasties goes to infinity, the saving rate reduces to the Brock-Prescott-
Mehra saving rate. This means that cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism
is not affecting the equilibrium saving rate when the number of dynasties is
infinitely large.
4.2 Efficiency
Recall that the equilibrium saving rate is inefficient due to the preference
externalities. Interpret the efficient saving rate as the saving rate that would
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emerge if all dynasties bargain over how much to save for immediate de-
scendants, under the assumption of cooperation also in the future (and by
the assumptions on technology, also no side-transfers). This means that the
present representatives of all dynasties come together with the aim of re-
alizing a Pareto optimal trajectory for the present generation, with their
preferences also including the preference for the future.
This is a normative setting similar to the cooperative solution to region-
ally integrated assessment models of the climate and economy (e.g., Nordhaus
and Yang, 1996), with the exception that these models do not account for
cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism (see Milgrom, 1993 and Hausman,
2011 for perspectives on preference satisfaction in behavioral welfare anal-
ysis). More precisely, I derive a stationary saving rate that, if used also in
the future, gives a Pareto optimal trajectory for the present generation. By
application of Negishi’s (1960) theorem, the efficient saving rate is shown to
be equal to the equilibrium saving rate if the dynasties act as if there is only
one dynasty.
I have the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Under Assumption 1, saving according to
kit = s
∗xit (11)
for all i and xt, where the constant saving rate, s
∗, is given by
s∗ = αD + αC , (12)
implies a Pareto optimal trajectory for the present generation, given that the
rule is used in the future.
Proof. Define the Negishi weights by φi ≥ 0 for all i and ∑i φi = 1.
Cooperation in all periods implements the maximum of∑
i
φiW i(tu) (13)
subject to 0 ≤ ∑i cit+τ ≤ ∑i xit+τ for all τ ∈ N0. Negishi’s (1960) theorem
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states that all Pareto optimal allocations (for the present generation, in the
case of Theorem 2) can be obtained by varying the vector of φi’s. The
following proof is an application of this result.
Replace s by s∗ (from expression (12)) in y, zj, u and vj from the proof
of Theorem 1. Denote the new expressions by y∗, z∗j, u∗ and v∗j, and insert
these in (13). The problem is to show that kit = s
∗xit for all i maximizes
∑
i
φi
[
(1− αD − αC) ln(xit − kit)
+ αD
(((N − 1)(1− αD)− (N − 2)αC) ln((1− s∗)Akit)
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC
+
αC
∑
` ln((1− s∗)Ak`t)
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC
)
+
αC
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
(((N − 1)(1− αD)− (N − 2)αC) ln((1− s∗)Akjt )
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC
+
αC(ln((1− s∗)Akit) +
∑
` 6=j ln((1− s∗)Ak`t))
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC
)]
.
The first derivative with respect to kit is:
− φi1− αD − αC
xit − kit
+
(
φi
αD((N − 1)(1− αD)− (N − 2)αC) + α2C
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC
+
∑
j 6=i
φj
αDαC +
αC
N−1(((N − 1)(1− αD)− (N − 2)αC) + (N − 2)αC)
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC
) 1
kit
,
which yields the first-order condition:
1− αD − αC
xit − kit
=
αD + αC
kit
,
when φi = 1/N for all i. To see this, note that the terms multiplied by 1/kit
can be written:
(αD + αC)
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC
(N − 1)(1− αD) + αC .
20
Therefore:
kit
xit
= αD + αC = s
∗,
which gives kit = s
∗xit.
The second derivative with respect to kit is:
−1− αD − αC
(xit − kit)2
− αD + αC
(kit)
2
,
and is strictly negative for kit ∈ (0, xit). All cross-derivatives equal 0, imply-
ing that the problem is concave. kit = s
∗xit therefore maximizes the problem.
The kjt ’s follow by symmetry.
I obtain the following corollary, describing the properties of the efficient
saving rate, s∗:
Corollary 2 Under Assumption 1, the efficient saving rate, s∗, has the fol-
lowing properties:
(i) s∗ = αD if αC = 0.
(ii) s∗ is increasing in αD.
(iii) s∗ is increasing in αC.
This follows from expression (12).
Define by
s∗ − s = αC − α
2
C
(N − 1)(1− αD − αC) + αC (14)
the wedge between the efficient and equilibrium saving rates. I obtain the
following corollary, describing the wedge, s∗ − s:
Corollary 3 Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium saving rate, s, is ineffi-
cient if αC > 0.
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This follows from expression (14), and is proved in Appendix A.
The efficient saving rate, s∗, is increasing in intergenerational altruism. It
reduces to the Brock-Prescott-Mehra rate of αD without cross-dynastic in-
tergenerational altruism. With cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism, the
efficient saving rate, s∗, is always larger than the equilibrium saving rate, s.
It follows from Corollaries 1 and 2 that this wedge increases to αC in the
limit case, when the number dynasties goes to infinity.
The present generation’s preference for future generations is reflected by
s∗, and can only be inferred from saving behavior when there is no cross-
dynastic intergenerational altruism, so that s∗ − s = 0. Efficient saving
may therefore translate into an increase in the relative weight on all future
generations when accounting for cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism.
As illustrated later, the policy implication could be a lowering of discount
rates inferred from saving behavior in the market, even if cross-dynastic
intergenerational altruism is small.
5 Time-inconsistency
I now establish how the main results relate to time-inconsistency and present-
biasedness (for early contributions, Strotz, 1955-1956; Phelps and Pollak,
1968), which has influenced the study of discounting (Weitzman, 2001; see
Arrow et al., 2013 and Groom and Hepburn, 2017), as well as procrastination,
intoxication, and addiction (Asheim, 1997). It will prove useful to first derive
a non-recursive formulation of the welfare function W i.
I have the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Under Assumption 1, welfare can be written non-recursively:
W i(tu) = (1− αD − αC)
( ∞∑
τ=0
∆τu
i
t+τ +
∑
j 6=i
∞∑
τ=0
Γτu
j
t+τ
)
, (15)
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with discount functions
∆τ =
1
N
(
(αD + αC)
τ + (N − 1)(αD − αC
N − 1)
τ
)
, (16)
Γτ =
1
N
(
(αD + αC)
τ − (αD − αC
N − 1)
τ
)
. (17)
Proof. The welfare function (15) follows by repeated substitution of W i and
W j’s into V from (5), keeping in mind that V = −∞ if ui = −∞. Discount
functions (16) and (17) are proven by induction.
The base case: Discount functions (16) and (17) hold for τ = 0 since
∆0 = 1 and Γ0 = 0.
The step case: Suppose that discount functions (16) and (17) hold for
τ − 1. Then,
∆τ = αD∆τ−1 +
αC
N − 1(N − 1)Γτ−1
= αD∆τ−1 + αCΓτ−1
=
1
N
(
αD(αD + αC)
τ−1 + αD(N − 1)(αD − αC
N − 1)
τ−1
+ αC(αD + αC)
τ−1 − αC(αD − αC
N − 1)
τ−1)
=
1
N
(
(αD + αC)
τ + (N − 1)(αD − αC
N − 1)
τ
)
,
by inserting for ∆τ−1 and Γτ−1. And,
Γτ =
αC
N − 1∆τ−1 + (αD +
(N − 2)αC
N − 1 )Γτ−1
=
1
N
( αC
N − 1(αD + αC)
τ−1 +
αC
N − 1(N − 1)(αD −
αC
N − 1)
τ−1
+ (αD +
(N − 2)αC
N − 1 )(αD + αC)
τ−1 − (αD + (N − 2)αC
N − 1 )(αD −
αC
N − 1)
τ−1)
=
1
N
(
(αD + αC)
τ − (αD − αC
N − 1)
τ
)
,
by inserting for ∆τ−1 and Γτ−1. This proves that discount functions (16) and
(17) hold for all τ ∈ N0.
It follows from (16) and (17) that ∆τ + (N − 1)Γτ = (αD + αC)τ . This
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ensures that W i is well-defined on UN .
The discount functions (16) and (17) give the weights the present generation
of dynasty i puts on the utility of generation τ in the same dynasty and each
of the other dynasties. They imply the following weights on the first two
generations:
∆0 = 1, ∆1 = αD,
Γ0 = 0, Γ1 =
αC
N − 1 .
Figure 2 illustrates these weights for N = 2. More generally, I have that
∆τ ≥ Γτ for all τ ∈ N.
The following observation will be helpful in interpreting the term struc-
ture of the discount rates. The total weight on all other dynasties, (N −
1)Γτ+1, is of importance to the construction of ∆τ+2 (in the proof of Theo-
rem 3). It also offers a new perspective on the limiting case of Theorem 1,
when the number of dynasties is finite, but goes infinity. Using expressions
(16) and (17), the link between ∆τ and ∆τ+2 via (N −1)Γτ+1 can be written
αC
N − 1(N − 1)
αC
N − 1 =
α2C
N − 1 → 0 as N →∞. (18)
The intuition is that although dynasty i gives weight αC on the other dynas-
ties, the other dynasties give weight αC/(N − 1) to dynasty i. This weight
goes to zero as the number of dynasties goes to infinity (see also Asheim and
Nesje, 2016).
5.1 Declining discount rates
To see that cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism implies declining dis-
count rates in equilibrium, consider the non-recursive formulation of the wel-
fare function (15). Importantly, note that since the behavior of one dynasty
does not depend on the utilities of other dynasties (from Theorem 1), only
the first summation is relevant for time-inconsistency.
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Assume for the moment that αC = 0. Then, ∆τ = α
τ
D and Γτ = 0 for
all τ ∈ N0. Inserting in (15) gives the dynastic intergenerational altruism
welfare function:
(1− αD)
∞∑
τ=0
ατDu
i
t+τ .
Since ∆τ/∆τ−1 = αD for all τ ∈ N, all generations weight within-dynasty
utility similarly. This implies a geometric discount function (i.e., constant
discount rates). Hence, the preference of each dynasty is time-consistent.
This is no longer the case with cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism. I
have the following propositions, which generalizes the claim related to Figure
3a in Section 2:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, the preference of each dynasty is non-
stationary, and thus time-inconsistent, if αC > 0.
This follows from expressions (16) and (17), and is proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1,
(i) ∆τ/∆τ−1 converges to αD+αC only in the limit, as time goes to infinity,
if αD > αC/(N − 1) > 0.
(ii) ∆τ/∆τ−1 converges to αD + αC immediately if αD = αC/(N − 1).
This follows from the proof of Proposition 1.
There are two cases: If αD > αC/(N − 1), then ∆τ/∆τ−1 is increasing from
αD and converges only in the limit to αD +αC , so that all generations weight
within-dynasty utility differently. This is a discount function with declining
discount rates. If αD = αC/(N − 1), ∆τ/∆τ−1 is increasing from αD and
converges immediately to αD+αC , so that only subsequent generations weight
within-dynasty utility differently. This implies a “quasi-hyperbolic” discount
function. In both cases, the preference of each dynasty is time-inconsistent.
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This observation differs from Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Sa´ez-Marti
and Weibull (2005), and more recently Galperti and Strulovici (2017), since
time-inconsistency in these papers follows from intergenerational altruism
being sensitive beyond the next generation of the same dynasty. Here, time-
inconsistency is due to altruism for the next generation as such. In line with
expression (18), the weight each other dynasty gives to a dynasty goes to zero
as the number of dynasties goes to infinity. (Consult the proofs of Theorem 3
and Proposition 1.) This leads to geometric discounting of the own dynasty
only in the limit.
In contrast, cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism implies constant
discount rates under efficiency (Theorem 2). This can be seen from the dis-
count functions (16) and (17), where (∆τ+(N−1)Γτ )/(∆τ−1+(N−1)Γτ−1) =
αD + αC for all τ ∈ N. From the discussion above, it is clear that ∆τ/∆τ−1
is increases from αD and approaches αD + αC .
An intuition for why efficient and equilibrium discounting agree in the
limit if αD > αC/(N − 1) can be obtained from the discount functions as
time goes to infinity. In a version of the model in Appendix B, I find that
the external effect of present saving becomes less important over time, and
vanishes only in the limit. This establish that a dynasty’s discount rate is
smaller for the long term. More precisely, I establish that limτ→∞∆τ/(∆τ +
(N − 1)Γτ ) = 1/N . Hence, one dynasty’s present value of a gain at time
t converges to 1/N of the social value of this benefit, when t approaches
infinity.
5.2 Generalized consumption Euler equations
An alternative starting point for deriving the stationary saving rate is Laibson
(1998). Laibson studies the extent of undersaving by a “quasi-hyperbolic”
discounter that is sophisticated, in the sense that he takes into account that
his preference is time-inconsistent. Krusell et al. (2002) integrate Laibson’s
insight into standard discrete-time macroeconomic models. (For continuous-
time formulations, see, e.g., Karp, 2007 and Ekeland and Lazrak, 2010.)
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Hiraguchi (2014) and Iverson and Karp (2018), that are closer to my contri-
bution, generalize Krusell et al. (2002) to an economy exhibiting declining
discount rates.
The equilibrium saving rate, s from expression (8), can be derived from
the generalized consumption Euler equation of Hiraguchi (2014) and Iverson
and Karp (2018):
s =
∑∞
τ=1 ∆τ∑∞
τ=0 ∆τ
, (19)
but for a distinct reason. I have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium saving rate, s from
expression (8), follows from the Hiraguchi-Iverson-Karp solution for s (19).
This follows from expression (16), and is proved in Appendix A.
Hiraguchi (2014) and Iverson and Karp (2018) assume declining discount
rates when deriving the saving rate. Here, the relation is an outcome of
the game of saving. This follows since the behavior of one dynasty does not
depend on the utilities of other dynasties (from Theorem 1). It is as if society
consists of N parallel dynasties with declining discount rates according to
expression (16).
6 Interdependent utility
I now establish how the main results relate to interdependent utility (Pearce,
1983; Bergstrom, 1999), focusing on a classical result on dynamic interde-
pendent utility and saving behavior (Sen, 1961, 1967; Marglin, 1963). It will
prove useful to first illustrate the qualitative robustness of the main results
by considering two formulations of intragenerational altruism replacing the
aggregator function, V , from expression (5).
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6.1 Paternalistic intragenerational altruism
Suppose that the present generation of dynasty i cares also about the util-
ity of contemporaries in the other dynasties. I allow for a decomposition
of intragenerational altruism into its dynastic, αA, and cross-dynastic, αB,
counterparts. As argued in the Introduction, there is strong empirical sup-
port for αA > αB/(N − 1).
The following additional assumption on the network of altruistic links will
be useful:
Assumption 2 Altruism parameters have the following restrictions: αA +
αB = 1 and αA ≥ αB/(N − 1) ≥ 0.
The restrictions embody the extreme cases: αA > αB = 0 (Section 3) and
αD = αB/(N−1) > 0, weight only on own dynasty contemporaries and equal
weight on all contemporaries.
The preference of each dynasty is represented by the welfare function W i.
Denote by u−i and W−i the vectors of utility and welfare in other dynasties.
Assume that there exists an aggregator function V : (R ∪ {−∞})2N → R ∪
{−∞} defined by:
V (ui, u−i,W i,W−i) =(1− αD − αC)
(
αAu
i +
αB
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
uj
)
+ αDW
i +
αC
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
W j,
(20)
where ui is the utility of the present generation in dynasty i, uj is the utility of
the present generation of another dynasty, W i is the welfare of the immediate
descendants of the same dynasty, and W j is the welfare of the immediate
descendants of another dynasty. Assume furthermore that V = −∞ if ui =
−∞ or, if αB > 0, uj = −∞.
I have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, welfare can be written non-
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recursively:
W i(tu) = (1− αD − αC)
( ∞∑
τ=0
∆τu
i
t+τ +
∑
j 6=i
∞∑
τ=0
Γτu
j
t+τ
)
, (21)
with discount functions
∆τ =
1
N
(
αA
(
(αD + αC)
τ + (N − 1)(αD − αC
N − 1)
τ
)
(22)
+ αB
(
(αD + αC)
τ − (αD − αC
N − 1)
τ
))
,
Γτ =
1
N
( αB
N − 1
(
(αD + αC)
τ + (N − 1)(αD − αC
N − 1)
τ
)
(23)
+ (αA +
(N − 2)αB
N − 1 )
(
(αD + αC)
τ − (αD − αC
N − 1)
τ
))
.
This follows from an application of the proof of Theorem 3, and is proved in
Appendix A.
The discount functions (22) and (23) give the weights the present generation
of dynasty i puts on the utility of generation τ in the same dynasty and each
of the other dynasties. They imply the following weights on the first two
generations:
∆0 = αA, ∆1 = αDαA + αC
αB
N − 1 ,
Γ0 =
αB
N − 1 , Γ1 =
αC
N − 1αA +
(
αD +
(N − 2)αC
N − 1
) αB
N − 1 .
Figures 4a and 4b illustrate the weights for αA = 1 (identical to Figure 2)
and αA according to Assumption 2 for N = 2. To see this, consider αA and
αB in Figure 4b. This follows directly from Assumption 2 as the weights
the present generation of dynasty i put on itself and contemporaries in the
other dynasty. The weight on the next generation in the same dynasty is
αDαA + αCαB, and follows because dynasty i cares dynastically and cross-
dynastically. By Assumption 2, the dynastic link is weighted by the share
put on the own dynasty utility and the cross-dynastic link by the share put
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on the other dynasty utility. The weight αDαB +αCαA follows by symmetry.
More generally, I have that ∆τ ≥ Γτ for all τ ∈ N0.
I have the following propositions, generalizing Propositions 1 and 2:
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the preference of each dynasty
is time-inconsistent, and thus time-inconsistent, if αA > αB/(N − 1) and
αC > 0.
This follows from expressions (22) and (23), and is proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1 and 2,
(i) ∆τ/∆τ−1 converges to αD+αC only in the limit, as time goes to infinity,
if αA > αB/(N − 1) and αD > αC/(N − 1) > 0.
(ii) ∆τ/∆τ−1 converges to αD + αC immediately if αA > αB/(N − 1) and
αD = αC/(N − 1).
This follows from the proof of Proposition 5.
Assuming αA > αB/(N − 1), there are two cases: If αD > αC/(N − 1),
then ∆τ/∆τ−1 is increasing from αD + αCαB/((N − 1)αA) and converges
only in the limit to αD + αC , so that all generations weight within-dynasty
utility differently. This is a discount function with declining discount rates.
If αD = αC/(N − 1), ∆τ/∆τ−1 is increasing from αD + αCαB/((N − 1)αA)
and converges immediately to αD + αC , so that only subsequent generations
weight within-dynasty utility differently. This implies a “quasi-hyperbolic”
discount function. In both cases, the preference of each dynasty is time-
inconsistent.
I obtain the following corollary, describing the equilibrium and efficient
saving rates:
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𝑢0
1 𝑢1
1
0 𝛼𝐶
𝑢0
2 𝑢1
2
1 𝛼𝐷
(a) Non-paternalistic cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism.
𝑢0
1 𝑢1
1
𝛼𝐵 𝛼𝐷𝛼𝐵 + 𝛼𝐶𝛼𝐴
𝑢0
2 𝑢1
2
𝛼𝐴 𝛼𝐷𝛼𝐴 + 𝛼𝐶𝛼𝐵
1 = 𝛼𝐴 + 𝛼𝐵
𝛼𝐴 ≥ 𝛼𝐵 ≥ 0
(b) Paternalistic cross-dynastic intragenerational altruism.
𝑢0
1 𝑢1
1
𝛼𝐸 𝛼𝐸𝛼𝐷
𝑢0
2 𝑢1
2
1 𝛼𝐷
1 > 𝛼𝐷 + 𝛼𝐸 > 0
𝛼𝐷 ≥ 𝛼𝐸 ≥ 0
(c) Non-paternalistic cross-dynastic intragenerational altruism.
Figure 4: Resulting discount functions with two dynasties (sequences) for
alternative preference formulations. Welfare implication of incremental util-
ity backward in time (direction of arrows). Subscript refers to generation,
superscript to dynasty.
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Corollary 4 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium and efficient sav-
ing rates can be written:
s = αD + αC
αAαC + αB(1− αD)
αA((N − 1)(1− αD − αC) + αC) + αBαC , (24)
s∗ = αD + αC . (25)
This follows from expressions (22) and (23), and is proved in Appendix A.
It then follows from Assumptions 1 and 2 that s∗ − s ≥ 0. Furthermore,
s∗ − s > 0 if αA > αB/(N − 1) and αC > 0. This means that all results
of the main text hold qualitatively even with paternalistic cross-dynastic
intragenerational altruism as long as the weight on the other dynasties in this
generation is smaller than the weight on the own dynasty in this generation.
Somewhat surprisingly for the stationary infinite horizon setting, it re-
duces to the following condition for s∗ > s:
∆0
∆1
>
Γ0
Γ1
,
that the relative weight on the utility of the present and next generations is
strictly larger for the own dynasty than for the other dynasty. Equilibrium
saving is thus inefficient because of the discrepancy between the dynastic
and cross-dynastic discount functions, but only in the first two generations.
The intuition follows from Assumptions 1 and 2. If there is a discrepancy
between the relative discounting of the first two generations then there is
also a discrepancy in any two generations.
6.2 Non-paternalistic intragenerational altruism
Suppose that the present generation of dynasty i now cares cross-dynastically
only for the other dynasties in the present generation rather than the next
generation. While there is less support for such preferences, it illustrates the
limit of the analysis.
The following alternative assumption on the network of altruistic links
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will be useful:
Assumption 3 Altruism parameters have the following restrictions: 1 >
αD + αE > 0 and αD ≥ αE/(N − 1) ≥ 0.
The restrictions embody the extreme cases: αD > αE = 0 (Barro, 1974) and
αD = αC/(N−1) > 0, weight only on own immediate descendants and equal
weight on immediate descendants in the own dynasty and contemporaries in
the other dynasties.
The preference of each dynasty is represented by the welfare function W i.
Denote by W−i the vector of welfare in other dynasties. Assume that there
exists an aggregator function V : (R ∪ {−∞})N+1 → R ∪ {−∞} defined by:
V (ui,W i,W−i) = (1− αD − αE)ui + αDW i + αE
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
W j, (26)
where ui is the utility of the present generation in dynasty i, W i is the
welfare of the immediate descendants of the same dynasty, and W j is the
welfare of the present generation of another dynasty. Assume furthermore
that V = −∞ if ui = −∞.
I have the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Under Assumption 3, welfare can be written non-recursively:
W i(tu) = (1− αD − αE)
( ∞∑
τ=0
∆τu
i
t+τ +
∑
j 6=i
∞∑
τ=0
Γτu
j
t+τ
)
, (27)
with discount functions
∆τ = α
τ
D, (28)
Γτ =
αE
N − 1α
τ
D, (29)
when ∆0 is normalized to 1.
This follows from an application of the proof of Theorem 3, and is proved in
Appendix A.
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The discount functions (28) and (29) give the weights the present generation
of dynasty i puts on the utility of generation τ in the same dynasty and each
of the other dynasties. They imply the following weights on the first two
generations:
∆0 = 1, ∆1 = αD,
Γ0 =
αE
N − 1 , Γ1 =
αE
N − 1αD.
Figure 4c illustrates these weights for N = 2. To see this, consider the weight
the present generation of dynasty i puts on itself. Since cross-dynastic in-
tragenerational altruism is reciprocal, this weight is (1 + αE + α
2
E + . . . ) =
1/(1− αE). Contemporaries in the other dynasty are additionally weighted
cross-dynastically, αE(1 + αE + α
2
E + . . . ) = αE/(1 − αE). Both dynas-
ties care dynastically about the next next generation, so that the resulting
weights are αD/(1 − αE) for dynasty i and αEαD/(1 − αE) for dynasty j.
Multiply through by 1 − αE to ensure ∆0 = 1. More generally, I have that
∆τ > Γτ for all τ ∈ N0.
I obtain the following corollary, describing the equilibrium and efficient
saving rates:
Corollary 5 Under Assumption 3, the equilibrium and efficient saving rates
can be written:
s = αD, (30)
s∗ = αD. (31)
This follows from expressions (28) and (29).
Hence, s∗−s = 0 for all αE. This means that cross-dynastic intragenerational
altruism alone is not sufficient for deriving the main results. Cross-dynastic
altruism needs to be sensitive to the welfare of future generations.
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This reduces to the following condition, implying s∗ = s:
∆0
∆1
=
Γ0
Γ1
,
that the relative weights on the utility of the present and next generations
are equal for the own dynasty and the other dynasties. Equilibrium saving
is efficient because of the similarity between the dynastic and cross-dynastic
discount functions.
6.3 The “isolation paradox”
Sen (1961, 1967) and Marglin (1963) developed a model of dynamic inter-
dependent utility and saving (see Robson and Szentes, 2014 for a recent
addition to this literature). In the terminology of this paper, they study a
two-period model in which present members of dynasties are altruistic to-
ward own descendants and descendants in other dynasties. Each dynasty
decide how much to save for own immediate descendants. As in the present
paper, the equilibrium saving rate is inefficiently low.
Sen (1961) names it the “isolation paradox” because each dynasty would
agree collectively to save more, although no dynasty is willing to do so in
“isolation” (borrowing Newbery’s 1990 explanation). Attempting to solve
this problem, Sen (1967) considers a bargain between all dynasties, aiming at
realizing a Pareto optimal trajectory for the present generation. The efficient
saving rate, s∗, can be interpreted as the saving rate that would emerge if
all the dynasties bargain over how much to save for immediate descendants.
Thus, the interpretation resembles that of the “isolation paradox” literature.
In Sen’s two-period model of within-dynasty saving (see also Lind, 1964),
the equilibrium saving rate, s, is inefficient if the relative weight on the utility
of the present and next generations is strictly larger for the own dynasty than
for the other dynasties. Using my notation, that is
∆0
∆1
>
Γ0
Γ1
. (32)
It follows from the discussion above that this condition is equal to the con-
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dition for s∗ > s. Sen’s (1967) condition thereby generalizes to a stationary
infinite horizon setting:
Remark 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, or Assumption 3, the condition for
the “isolation paradox” to arise in Sen’s two-period model, given by expression
(32), is equal in the stationary infinite horizon model.
Hence, only the utility weights in the first two generations are relevant for
determining whether equilibrium saving is inefficient. The intuition follows
from Assumptions 1 and 2, or Assumption 3. If there is a discrepancy be-
tween the relative discounting of the first two generations then there is also
a discrepancy in any two generations.
Accounting for cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism also exposes a
limitation to, and extends, Sen’s (1967) “isolation paradox”. In Sen’s two-
period model, cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism cannot effect the de-
cision of how much to save. This is not the case in the model of this paper,
except in the limit case, when the number of dynasties goes to infinity:
Remark 2 Under Assumption 1, αC affects the decision of how much to
save, except in the limit as N → ∞. In Sen’s two-period model this is not
the case for any N .
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I ask whether the trade-off between present utility and fu-
ture welfare can be inferred from saving behavior. Answering this ques-
tion, I study a setting with cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism. Cross-
dynastic intergenerational altruism is the welfare weight on the next genera-
tion in other dynasties. It can be motivated by a concern for sustainability,
or if descendants move or marry outside the dynasty. Crucially, savings for
one’s own descendants benefit present members of other dynasties. This gives
rise to preference externalities because the other dynasties also care cross-
dynastically. I show that intergenerational altruism may not be inferred from
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Figure 5: Implications for the relative weights by changes in the wedge be-
tween the efficient and equilibrium saving, s∗− s. Assume that a generation
is 30 years and that N → ∞. From Nordhaus (2008): αD = 0.98530. The
wedge, which is a measure of preference externalities, is given by s∗−s→ αC .
Consider cases αC = 0, 0.1αD, and 0.2αD.
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saving behavior as long as the relative weight on the utility of the present
and next generations is strictly larger for the own dynasty than the other
dynasties. I also find that the external effect of present saving decreases over
time. This implies that the utility discount rate consistent with saving be-
havior is decreasing. In general, this discount rate converges to the efficient
level only in the limit, as time goes to infinity.
Yet, the utility discount rate in public guidelines is typically informed by
saving behavior (OECD, 2018). To illustrate the consequence of the adoption
of such discount rates, assume that a generation is 30 years. Assume fur-
thermore that the number of dynasties goes to infinity, N → ∞. Nordhaus
(2008) offers an influential-market based calibration. According to Nord-
haus, the relative weight on future generations can then be expressed as
s → αD = 0.98530 ≈ 64%. The main results gave the following wedge be-
tween the efficient and equilibrium saving rates: s∗−s→ αC . This measures
the preference externalities due to cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism.
Figure 5a exemplifies the shift of relative weights forward in time by ac-
counting for cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism (s∗ − s → αC , with
αC = 0, 0.1αD and 0.2αD, respectively), thereby correcting the externality
problem. From the restriction that αC is less than or equal to (N − 1)αD,
it is clear that I consider very low αC among those that satisfy this re-
striction. Accounting for cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism implies
relative weights on future generations of 64%, 70%, and 76%, leading to dis-
count rates below the rate inferred from saving behavior (1.2% and 0.9%, as
compared to the Nordhaus rate of 1.5%). Figure 5b illustrates the percentage
change in these weights as compared to the Nordhaus calibration, clarifying
that even accounting for limited levels of cross-dynastic intergenerational al-
truism is important. The weight on future generations increase by 10% and
20%, respectively. The immediate implication for policy guidelines is that
discount rates implied from saving behavior should be lowered.
The analysis has clarified the conceptual basis for the above claim in
a model of within-dynasty saving. I argued in the Introduction that the
condition on preference parameters for preference externalities to emerge are
likely to hold in practice. But, not all transfers to future generations are in
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the form of dynastic saving. One might additionally consider transfers to
the immediate descendants of all dynasties, and whether such transfers can
crowd out transfers to own immediate descendants.
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Appendix A
This section contains additional proofs of results.
Proof of Theorem 1 – Uniqueness
The following proves that (7) is the unique MPE in the finite horizon game.
Let the remaining horizon be H. Write
U i((hH+1, xH)) = max
ki
F (x, ki, H), (33)
ki((hH+1, xH)) =
∑H
τ=1 ∆τ∑H
τ=0 ∆τ
xi = argmax
ki
F (x, ki, H) := sHx
i, (34)
where, based on a finite horizon version of (15):
F (x, ki, H) = (1− αD − αC)
(
ln(xi − ki) +
H∑
τ=1
∆τ ln(k
i) + CH
)
, (35)
with constant
CH =
∑
j 6=i
H∑
τ=1
Γτ ln(k
j) +
H∑
τ=1
(αD + αC)
τ ln
(
(1− sH−τ )
τ−1∏
`=1
sH−` Aτ
)
,
depending on the present saving of other dynasties and growth terms implied
by future play. The value function (33) and strategy (34) are proven by
induction.
The base case: Expressions (33) and (34) hold for H = 0 due to the
convention
∑0
τ=1 ∆τ = 0.
The step case: The problem for dynasty i with remaining horizon H is
to maximize (35) with respect to ki. The first derivative is:
− 1
xi − ki +
∑H
τ=1 ∆τ
ki
,
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which yields the first-order condition:
1
xi − ki =
∑H
τ=1 ∆τ
ki
.
Therefore:
ki =
∑H
τ=1 ∆τ∑H
τ=0 ∆τ
xi,
which gives ki = sHx
i. The second derivative is:
− 1
(xi − ki)2 −
∑H
τ=1 ∆τ
(ki)2
,
and strictly negative for ki ∈ (0, xi). This verifies that the problem is concave.
The solution ki = sHx
i satisfies the strategy (34), and also the value function
(33) due to the independence of the kj’s.
The above establishes uniqueness in a finite horizon game. From expres-
sion (19), it is clear that
lim
H→∞
sHx
i = sxi.
Hence, it is shown that there exists a unique SPE in the finite horizon game
for any horizon. The equilibrium strategies used in these finite horizon games
go to the linear strategy with s given by (8) when the horizon goes to infinity.
Proof of Corollary 1
Statements are proven one-by-one:
(i) follows by inserting for αC = 0 in expression (8).
(ii) follows by taking the first derivative of s with respect to αD:
1 +
α2C(N − 1)(
(N − 1)(1− αD − αC) + αC
)2 > 0,
since 1 > αD + αC .
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(iii) follows by taking the first derivative of s with respect to αC :
2αC
(N − 1)(1− αD − αC) + αC +
α2C(N − 2)(
(N − 1)(1− αD − αC) + αC
)2 > 0.
(iv) follows by taking the first derivative of s with respect to N :
−α2C
(1− αD − αC)(
(N − 1)(1− αD − αC) + αC
)2 < 0.
(v) follows by taking the following limit:
lim
N→∞
αD +
α2C
(N − 1)(1− αD − αC) + αC = αD + 0 = αD.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 3
Assume αC > 0. Compare the equilibrium saving rate, s from (8), with the
efficient saving rate, s∗:
αC >
α2C
(N − 1)(1− αD − αC) + αC ,
since (N − 1)(1 − αD − αC) > 0. This verifies that the equilibrium saving
rate is inefficiently low for all N > 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
Write the relative utility weight of two subsequent generations
∆τ
∆τ−1
=
αD∆τ−1 + αCΓτ−1
∆τ−1
= αD + αC
Γτ−1
∆τ−1
, (36)
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by inserting from (16). Combine expressions (16) and (17),
Γτ−1
∆τ−1
=
(αD + αC)
τ−1 − (αD − αCN−1)τ−1
(αD + αC)τ−1 + (N − 1)(αD − αCN−1)τ−1
. (37)
There are two cases:
Case 1: Assume αD > αC/(N − 1). The fraction ∆τ/∆τ−1 in (40) is
increasing from αD and converges only in the limit to αD +αC . This follows
directly from (41): Γ0/∆0 = 0, Γτ/∆τ is increasing in τ (since the nominator
is increasing in τ , and the denominator is decreasing), and limτ→∞ Γτ/∆τ =
1. This means that all generations weight within-dynasty utility differently.
Hence, the preference of each dynasty is time-inconsistent
Case 2: Assume αD = αC/(N − 1). The fraction ∆τ/∆τ−1 in (40) is
increasing from αD and converges immediately to αD + αC . This follows
directly from (41): Γ0/∆0 = 0 and Γτ/∆τ = 1 for all τ ∈ N. This means
that only subsequent generations weight within-dynasty utility differently.
Hence, the preference of each dynasty is time-inconsistent.
Proof of Proposition 3
Define the geometric series
∞∑
τ=0
(αD + αC)
τ =
1
1− αD − αC , (38)
(N − 1)
∞∑
τ=0
(αD − αC
N − 1)
τ =
N − 1
1− αD + αCN−1
. (39)
Hence, by (16), it follows from (38) and (39) that
∞∑
τ=0
∆τ =
1
N
( 1
1− αD − αC +
N − 1
1− αD + αCN−1
)
,
which, by rewriting (19), implies
s =
∑∞
τ=0 ∆τ − 1∑∞
τ=0 ∆τ
= αD +
α2C
(N − 1)(1− αD − αC) + αC .
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This is identical to expression (8), the equilibrium saving rate.
Proof of Proposition 4
The welfare function (21) follows by repeated substitution of W i and W j’s
into V from (20), keeping in mind that V = −∞ if ui = −∞ or, if αB > 0,
uj = −∞. Discount functions (22) and (23) are proven by induction.
The base case: Discount functions (22) and (23) hold for τ = 0 since
∆0 = αA and Γ0 = αB/(N − 1).
The step case: Suppose that discount functions (22) and (23) hold for
τ − 1. Then,
∆τ = αD∆τ−1 + αCΓτ−1
=
1
N
(
αA
(
(αD + αC)
τ + (N − 1)(αD − αC
N − 1)
τ
)
+ αB
(
(αD + αC)
τ − (αD − αC
N − 1)
τ
))
,
by inserting for ∆τ−1 and Γτ−1 (and noting the similarity to the Theorem 3).
And,
Γτ =
αC
N − 1∆τ−1 +
(
αD +
(N − 2)αC
N − 1
)
Γτ−1
=
1
N
( αB
N − 1
(
(αD + αC)
τ + (N − 1)(αD − αC
N − 1)
τ
)
+ (αA +
(N − 2)αB
N − 1 )
(
(αD + αC)
τ − (αD − αC
N − 1)
τ
))
.
by inserting for ∆τ−1 and Γτ−1 (and noting the similarity to Theorem 3).
This proves that discount functions (22) and (23) hold for all τ ∈ N0.
It follows from (22) and (23) that ∆τ + Γτ = (αD + αC)
τ . This ensures
that W i is well-defined on UN .
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Proof of Proposition 5
Write the relative utility weight of two subsequent generations
∆τ
∆τ−1
=
αD∆τ−1 + αCΓτ−1
∆τ−1
= αD + αC
Γτ−1
∆τ−1
, (40)
by inserting from (22). Combine expressions (22) and (23),
Γτ−1
∆τ−1
=
αB
N−1f +
(
αA +
(N−2)αB
N−1
)
g
αAf + αBg
, (41)
where
f ≡ (αD + αC)τ−1 − (αD − αC
N − 1)
τ−1,
g ≡ (αD + αC)τ−1 + (N − 1)(αD − αC
N − 1)
τ−1.
Assuming αA > αB/(N − 1), there are two cases:
Case 1: Assume αD > αC/(N − 1). The fraction ∆τ/∆τ−1 in (40) is
increasing from αD + αCαB/((N − 1)αA) and converges only in the limit to
αD +αC . This follows directly from (41): Γ0/∆0 = αB/(N − 1)αA, Γτ/∆τ is
increasing in τ (since the nominator is increasing in τ , and the denominator is
decreasing), and limτ→∞ Γτ/∆τ = 1. This means that all generations weight
within-dynasty utility differently. Hence, the preference of each dynasty is
time-inconsistent
Case 2: Assume αD = αC/(N − 1). The fraction ∆τ/∆τ−1 in (40) is
increasing from αD +αCαB/((N −1)αA) and converges immediately to αD +
αC . This follows directly from (41): Γ0/∆0 = αB/(N − 1)αA and Γτ/∆τ = 1
for all τ ∈ N. This means that only subsequent generations weight within-
dynasty utility differently. Hence, the preference of each dynasty is time-
inconsistent.
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Proof of Corollary 4
For discount function (22), it follows from (38) and (39) that
∞∑
τ=0
∆τ =
1
N
( 1
1− αD − αC +
(
αA − αB
N − 1
) N − 1
1− αD + αCN−1
)
,
which, by the Hiraguchi-Iverson-Karp solution, implies
s =
∑∞
τ=0 ∆τ − αA∑∞
τ=0 ∆τ
= αD + αC
αAαC + αB(1− αD)
αA((N − 1)(1− αD − αC) + αC) + αBαC .
This is identical to expression (24), the equilibrium saving rate. The efficient
saving rate (25) follows immediately from (22) and (23).
Proof of Proposition 7
The welfare function (27) follows by repeated substitution of W i and W j’s
into V from (26), keeping in mind that V = −∞ if ui = −∞. Discount
functions (28) and (29) are proven by induction.
The base case: Discount functions (28) and (29) hold for τ = 0 since
∆0 = 1 and Γ0 = αE, under the condition that ∆0 is normalized to 1.
The step case: Suppose that discount functions (28) and (29) hold for
τ − 1. Then,
∆τ = αD∆τ−1 = ατD,
by inserting for ∆τ−1. And,
Γτ =
αE
N − 1αD∆τ−1 =
αE
N − 1α
τ
D,
by inserting for ∆τ−1. This proves that discount functions (28) and (29) hold
for all τ ∈ N0.
It follows from (28) and (29) that ∆τ + Γτ = (1 + αE)α
τ
D. This ensures
that W i is well-defined on UN .
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Appendix B
This section provides interpretations of the model if descendants can move
or marry someone from other dynasties.
The “dynastic family”
In response to Barro’s (1974) formulation of intergenerational altruism, Bern-
heim and Bagwell (1988) consider the case in which each generation consists
of a large number of individuals, and that links between dynasties imply
that individuals belong to different dynasties. A limitation of their analysis
is that these links are hypothesized and not modeled. Laitner (1991) and
Zhang (1994) formulate links between two dynasties through marital con-
nections, but focus on cross-sectional neutrality of policies and assortative
mating, respectively. Myles (1997) state a more general preference, but is
silent about its implications for the discount function.
I give a new interpretation of the discount function. Define for now αC
as the relative probability of immediate descendants ending up in the other
dynasties, for example through mating. (Consult Proposition 8 in the next
subsection for a statistical interpretation of the discount functions.) Then,
discount functions (16) and (17) are Markov chains assigning the relative
probabilities that descendants end up in different dynasties:
Remark 3 Under Assumption 1, the fraction ∆τ/(∆τ + (N − 1)Γτ ) assigns
the probability that the descendants of the present generation of a dynasty are
in the same dynasty τ generations from now.
Note that
∆τ
∆τ + (N − 1)Γτ =
1
N
(αD + αC)
τ + (N − 1)(αD − αCN−1)τ
(αD + αC)τ
,
by inserting from expressions (16) and (17). Observe that limτ→∞∆τ/(∆τ +
(N − 1)Γτ ) = 1/N , implying convergence to a uniform distribution if αD >
αC/(N−1). In fact, the uniform distribution follows since the external effect
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of present saving becomes less important over time, and vanishes only in the
limit.
Statistical interpretation
Consider discount functions (16) and (17) for N = 2. I have the following
proposition:
Proposition 8 Assume N = 2. Under Assumption 1, discount functions
(16) and (17) can be written:
∆τ =
∑
q even
0≤q≤τ
(
τ
τ − q
)
ατ−qD α
q
C , (42)
Γτ =
∑
q odd
0≤q≤τ
(
τ
τ − q
)
ατ−qD α
q
C .
Proof. The right-hand side of (42) can be simplified. Do the following
rescaling of parameters: α˜D = αD/(αD + αC) and α˜C = αC/(αD + αC).
Since α˜D + α˜C = 1, I can work with sums of binomial distributions. Write
the sum over q even and q odd distributions as:
τ∑
q=0
(
τ
τ − q
)
ατ−qD α
q
C = (αD + αC)
τ∑
q=0
(
τ
τ − q
)
α˜D
τ−qα˜Cq
= (αD + αC)
τ , (43)
where the last line follow since the summation is now the total cumulative
probability distribution of a binomial distribution, and is equal to 1. The
difference between q even and q odd distributions can be expressed as:
∑
q even
0≤q≤τ
(
τ
τ − q
)
ατ−qD α
q
C −
∑
q odd
0≤q≤τ
(
τ
τ − q
)
ατ−qD α
q
C
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=
∑
q even
0≤q≤τ
(−1)q
(
τ
τ − q
)
ατ−qD α
q
C +
∑
q odd
0≤q≤τ
(−1)q
(
τ
τ − q
)
ατ−qD α
q
C
=
τ∑
q=0
(
τ
τ − q
)
ατ−qD (−αqC) = (αD − αC)τ , (44)
using the definitions of α˜D and α˜C .
Using the insights from expressions (43) and (44), expression (42) can be
written:
∆τ =
1
2
(
(αD + αC)
τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
q even + q odd
+ (αD − αC)τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
q even - q odd
)
,
which is identical to (16) for N = 2.
For completeness, define Γτ as:
Γτ = (αD + αC)
τ −∆τ
= (αD + αC)
τ − 1
2
(
(αD + αC)
τ + (αD − αC)τ
)
=
1
2
(
(αD + αC)
τ − (αD − αC)τ
)
,
which is identical to (17) for N = 2.
From the point of view of the present generation of dynasty i, even time
periods allow more cross-dynastic altruistic intergenerational links forward
in time, as compared to the preceding odd time period. This asymmetry is
clear from extending Figure 2 forward in time. The expression within the
summation in (42) resembles a binomial distribution, with the exception that
αD + αC < 1.
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